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too harsh in light of her conduct?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Licensee Teresa Nelson seeks judicial review of an Order
on Review entered April 10, 1992, by the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing, Department of Commerce, revoking her
licenses to practice as a Clinical and Certified Social Worker in
the State of Utah.
The formal administrative hearing held in this matter was
conducted

pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.

Licensee is challenging the Order entered by the Division on
several grounds.
First, Licensee contends that the Administrative Law
Judge erred by refusing to allow her to present evidence to the
Board

of

Social Work

Examiners that

she passed

a polygraph

examination.
Licensee also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting

the

findings, and challenges the severity

of the

sanction imposed by the Division.
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah App. 1991), this Court ruled that a party challenging the
sufficiency

of

the

evidence

to

support

the

findings,

must

demonstrate that the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.
Id. at 67; See also. Section 63-46b-16(4)(g).
In order to show that the evidence is insufficient, a
party must marshall the evidence in support of the findings, and
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On April 18, 1990, the Utah Division
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to preclude any testimony from polygraph examiners as well as
excluding any result from evidence.

The administrative law judge

ordered that evidence of the polygraph examination given to Nelson
shall be excluded in the hearing conducted before the Board of
Social Work Examiners; that witnesses and counsel are prohibited
from making any reference to the examination or to the results
thereof in the proceedings before the Board; and that polygraph
examiners shall be precluded from testifying during the hearing
before the board. (R. at 185).

Licensee contends that the failure

of the administrative law judge to allow her to present polygraph
evidence was erroneous and appeals from that order.
A hearing was conducted on November 13-14, 1991, and then was
resumed and completed on December 4, 1991 before J. Steven Eklund,
Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Commerce, and the
Board of Social Work Examiners.

The board heard testimony for

several days and issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommend Order.

(R. at 65-80).

The Division adopted the recommended Order that Nelson's
license as a clinical social worker be suspended for three years,
and that her license as a certified social worker be suspended for
one year. The Order also required Nelson to attend receive therapy
and complete an education program.

The Order also provided that

upon reinstatement of her license to practice as a certified social
worker that she not practice in a private setting.
Licensee then filed a request for agency review seeking that
the portion of the recommended order providing for a three years
4

suspension of her license as a clinical social worker and a one
year suspension of her license as a certified social worker be
reversed and that she be allowed to practice.

(R. at 51) .

She

also challenged the requirement that she not engage in private
practice upon reinstatement.

(R. at 51).

The Order on Review

stayed the orders revoking Nelson's licenses. The Order on Review
also reduced the period of suspension from three years to six
months.

Other minor modifications to the Division's order were

also made. (R. at 9-15).
On April 20, 1992, Licensee moved to stay the order entered
against her pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46B-18.
for a stay of the order was denied.

(R. at 1) .

That motion
Licensee then

filed this appeal and the Division's order was stayed by this Court
during the pendency of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Petitioner Teresa Nelson (Licensee) is a licensed certified
clinical social worker in the State of Utah.

During all times

relevant to this proceeding, she has been engaged in full-time
private practice as a clinical social worker.
licensed in the State of Utah since 1983.

She has been

(TR. at 31).

Commencing late in 1981, Licensee provided counseling to a
client, (K.G.) for problems associated with depression, suicidal
ideation, alcohol and substance abuse. (R. at 67) . This counseling
took place while Ms. Nelson was employed at the Summit County
Prevention Center.

These counseling sessions continued over a

period of several months.

Based on K.G.'s financial ability, he
5

was required by the Prevention Center to only make nominal payments
for the services provided by Licensee.

Nelson subsequently left

her employment with the Summit County Prevention Center in 1982.
In September, 1984, K.G. contacted Licensee and indicated that
he wanted to commence counseling with her in her private practice.
(TR. at 533).

From September, 1984 to July, 1985, Licensee

provided at least 40 hours of counseling to K.G., consisting of
approximately 33 sessions.

(R. at 67).

At the time K.G. discussed retaining Licensee she told him
that her fee was $55.00 per hour.

(TR. at 533).

K.G. told

Licensee that he was a certified wind surfing instructor, and that
he was unable to afford her fees.

(TR. at 534). Licensee agreed

that she would be willing to accept wind surfing lessons from K.G.
as payment for her services.

(TR. at 535-36).

Licensee testified

that she was not aware of any rule or ethical constraint against
accepting a barter form of payment for her services.

(TR. at 558) .

Early in 1985, K.G. informed Licensee that he and his wife,
Ruth, were experiencing marital difficulty.

(R. at 69) . Licensee

agreed to meet with K.G. 's wife, Ruth, for a single session, and to
meet jointly with Ruth and K.G. subsequent to that.
Licensee

met

with

K.G.'s

wife

on

February

(TR. at 561) .

26,

1985,

and

subsequently held two joint counseling sessions beginning March 5,
1985. Licensee testified that during her meeting with K.G.'s wife,
she discussed

with her the goals of her marriage. Licensee

indicated that K.G.'s wife told her that she was considering a
divorce from K.G.

(TR. at 561-62) .
6

In the joint counseling

sessions

which

Licensee

held

with

possibility of divorce was discussed.

K.G.

and

his

wife,

the

Both K.G. and his wife

testified that they felt that Licensee had suggested that they
divorce.

(TR. at 302) .

Licensee testified that she did not

suggest that they obtain a divorce, but rather discussed divorce
with them as a option, and also as a therapeutic device or "shock
technique" to persuade the parties to start seriously thinking
about their relationship.

(TR. at 563). No further joint sessions

were conducted.
During a therapy session with K.G. on May 28, 1985, K.G.
informed Licensee that he and his wife were separated and filing
for a divorce.

(TR. at 574-75); (R. at 70). Licensee continued

counseling sessions with K.G. between May 28, 1985 and July 18,
1985.

During the eight counseling sessions which Licensee held

with K.G. between May 31, 1985 to July 18, 1985, Licensee continued
to work with K.G. to help him to resolve some issues surrounding
the separation from his wife.

(TR. at 576). Licensee testified

that during the last therapy session with K.G. on July 18, that
therapy was terminated at K.G.'s request. Licensee testified that
K.G. knew that therapy was terminated at this time; that it was
discussed between them, and that it was her perception that he
understood that the therapy would be terminated.

(TR. at 582) .

Licensee also testified that K.G. had realized that he could no
longer afford the sessions with her, and that he had communicated
that fact to her on several occasions.

(TR. at 576-77).

K.G. testified that it was not his understanding that the
7

client/therapist relationship was terminated on July 18, 1985.
(TR. at 255-56) . His testimony was that "our relationship at that
time was strong enough... that it was okay if I didn't see her in
her office".

(TR. at 265). K.G. further testified that he had

developed a romantic affection for Ms. Nelson; that he was having
sexual fantasies about her and that he was in love with her.
at 255-56).

(TR.

He further testified that he never informed the

Licensee that he had these romantic and sexual feelings toward her.
(TR. at 356).
The Board determined that Licensee did in fact not terminate
the client/therapist relationship with K.G. on July 18, 1985 and
also found that K.G. believed his status as a client did not end on
July 18, 1985.

(R. at 71). It was undisputed that K.G. was not

seen by Licensee in her office following July 18, 1985.
In mid-August, 1985, K.G. contacted the Licensee and asked her
to play tennis.

(TR. at 583-84).

Licensee testified that she

again informed K.G. during this conversation that the therapy
process was over.

(TR. at 584).

Licensee testified that K.G.

informed her that he only wanted to touch bases with her once in a
while and say hello. In August and early September, 1985, K.G. and
Licensee socialized on three separate occasions specifically, on
one occasion they played tennis, and twice K.G visited Nelson at
her home.

(R. at 71) .

On the second visit which K.G. paid to Licensee's house, she
informed him that she was going on vacation to the island of Maui,
Hawaii. K.G. told Licensee that Maui was the "wind surfing capital
8

of the world" and they discussed her trip.

(TR. at 591).

K.G. contacted Licensee two days prior to her leaving for
Maui, and informed her that he had purchased a ticket to go to
Maui.

He further inquired as to whether she would allow him to

stay in the condominium that she had rented.
Licensee

testified

that

she

did

not

(TR. at 593-94) .

believe

that

K.G.

was

romantically interested in her at that time, but rather that he
wanted to go to Hawaii to wind surf and her vacation provided him
with an inexpensive way for him to do that.
agreed to allow K.G. to meet her in Hawaii.

(TR. at 594) . She
The board found that

there was insufficient evidence to find that Licensee invited K.G.
to join her on this trip.

(R. at 71).

Licensee and K.G. were in Hawaii for approximately one week,
and spent the majority of their time together.

(R. at 72). K.G.

testified that while he was in Hawaii with Licensee, that she used
strawberry icecream on him while performing oral sex.

(TR.at 259) ;

(TR. at 185). Licensee ademately denied any sexual activity with
K.G. during the trip to Hawaii at any time in 1985.

(TR.cit 530).

The Board found that the more creditable evidence showed that
no intercourse had occurred between K.G. and Licensee, but that
they did engage in oral sex while in Hawaii.

Interesstingly,

however, Finding of Fact #16 states that while they did engage in
oral sex "there is a lack of creditable evidence to find that such
conduct took place as specifically described by K.G. during the
proceeding."
Following the trip to Hawaii through late October, 1985,
9

Licensee and K.G. were together on four additional occasions.
Specifically, Licensee, her children, and K.G., had dinner at her
home in late September; K.G. arrived drunk and unannounced at
Licensee's home one night; they met at a soccer game in early
October; and they also had dinner in a restaurant in late October,
1985.

The Board found that Licensee and K.G. briefly kissed and

hugged on at least one of the occasions, but they did not engage in
any sexual activity other than what had occurred in Hawaii during
the previous month.

(R. at 72).

The Board found that the client-

therapist relationship ceased to exist after late October, 1985,
and Licensee and K.G. had no contact whatsoever after October 1985,
until the fall of 1988.

(R. at 71).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner, Teresa Nelson, is a Licensed Clinical Certified
Social Worker in the State of Utah.

Following an administrative

hearing before the Board of Social Work Examiners, the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing issued an Order imposing
sanctions against Petitioner's license.
Licensee argues in this brief that the Administrative Law
Judge erred by refusing to allow her to introduce evidence of
polygraph results, and by refusing to allowing polygraph examiners
to testify before the Board.
Licensee also argues that the record as a whole does not
support certain findings of the Board, and that the findings that
are supported by the record as a whole do not justify the harsh
sanctions imposed by the Division.
10

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW PETITIONER
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF HER POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION RESULTS, AND BY
REFUSING TO ALLOW POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE BOARD.
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing filed
a Motion in Limine requesting the Administrative Law Judge to rule
on evidentiary matters involving a polygraph examination taken by
Petitioner Teresa Nelson.
exclude

evidence

1)

Specifically, the Division sought to

that

Petitioner

was

given

a

polygraph

examination; 2) that witnesses and counsel be prohibited from
making any reference to that examination or the results thereof; 3)
that polygraph examiners be precluded from testifying at the
hearing, and 4) that all witnesses be instructed not to refer to
the examination or the results thereof.
Section 63-46b-8(1)(b), UTAH CODE ANN., provides that on the
motion of the presiding officer or upon objection of a party, the
presiding

officer

may

exclude

evidence

that

is

irrelevant,

immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Relying on this authority, the
Administrative Law Judge granted the Divisionfs motion to exclude
all polygraph evidence.

Petitioner asserts that this ruling

constitutes error, and is not consistent with the somewhat relaxed
rules of evidence that apply at administrative hearings.
It is well settled in Utah that polygraph examination
results may be admitted

into evidence when there is a valid

stipulation between the parties. State v. Abel. 600 P.2d 994, 998
(Utah 1979) . The Court in Abel expressly left open the question of
11

whether polygraph results may be admitted in the absence of a
stipulation. The Court has provided criteria useful in determining
when polygraph results may be admitted.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the strict rules as to
the

admissibility

of

evidence

are

somewhat

relaxed

in

administrative hearings. State Dep't of Community Affairs v. Utah
Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah 1980). Section 6346b-8(l)(c) provides that evidence will not be excluded solely on
the basis that it is hearsay.

Given the less ridgid rules

governing admission of evidence at an administrative hearing, the
administrative law judge should not have excluded the polygraph
results only because the Division did not stipulate to their
admission.
In State v. Rebetrano. 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court noted that certain conditions must be met before
stipulated polygraph results could be admitted

into evidence.

First, participation in the examination must be free and voluntary.
The Court must be allowed to exclude evidence if the examiner was
not qualified, or if the conditions under which the test was
administered were unfair. Further, the party opposing the evidence
must be allowed to cross examine the examiner as to his expertise;
the reliability of polygraph examinations; and the accuracy of the
apparatus used.

The trier of fact should also be instructed that

the examiners opinion is not conclusive, but is only to be taken as
an opinion.
In the

Id. at 1268.
case

at bar, admission
12

of the

results was not

stipulated to by the Division.

However, the conditions of the

Rebetrano decision could all have been met.
that

the Licensee's participation

voluntary.

There is no question

in the test was

free and

Further, the Division could easily have been afforded

the opportunity to cross-examine the examiner as to his expertise;
and also examine the examiner as to the reliability

of the

polygraph itself and the accuracy of the apparatus used.

In

denying Nelson the opportunity to even lay the foundation to
determine whether the polygraph results could be admitted, the ALJ
erred.
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1977), the Utah
Supreme Court did not allow a defendant in a criminal case to use
evidence

of

stipulation.

a

polygraph

examination

in

the

absence

of

a

It is clear from the Tillman decision that the

decision as to whether to admit polygraph evidence is determinative
upon an adaquate foundation for assessing the reliability and
probative value of the polygraph examination. Id. at 557. In this
case, the Licensee was never given the opportunity to lay a
foundation for the polygraph.

The ALJ apparently adopted the

position that the polygraph evidence is per se inadmissabl€* in the
absence of a stipulation.
In The Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 1987), the
Florida Supreme Court considered a case in which polygraph results
were admitted in evidence in the absence of a stipulation.

In

Pavlick, an attorney facing disbarment offerred evidence that he
had taken and passed a polygraph examination.
13

In Pavlick. as well

as in the case at bar, the evidence of professional wrongdoing
consisted of the statements of one individual.

The only evidence

that Nelson engaged in sexual activity with K.G. in Hawaii was
K.G.'s statement to that affect, an accusation that was made four
years after the alleged wrongful conduct was to have occurred.
In Commonwealth v. Moore, 393 N.E.2d 904, 910, (Mass. 1979),
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered the question of
failing to admit a polygraph result to impeach a prosecution
witness. The Moore Court did not overturn the conviction below due
to the failure of the court to allow the evidence, noting that
there were several other witnesses that testified to the same
facts.

In this case, K.G.'s accusation is the only evidence of

wrongdoing that would justify the revocation levied upon Nelson.
The absence of a stipulation should not preclude the admission
of polygraph results in administrative hearings.

As the Utah

Supreme Court noted in Abel, "a stipulation does not in any way
establish the reliability or accuracy of polygraph results."
at 997.

Id.

The Court has also found that polygraph tests properly

administered do have a degree of reliability.

Rebetrano at 1269.

Given the fact that the statement of Nelson's accuser was the
only substantial evidence that the sexual activity

in Hawaii

occurred, and that was the evidence that was the basis for the
revocation of her license, the ALJ errer by not allowing the Board
to hear the polygraph evidence.

14

POINT 11
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT
LICENSEE ENGAGED IN SEXUAL CONDUCT WITH K.G. IN 1985.
Section 58-35-11, Utah Code Ann., (1953 as amended),
provides

that

the

Division

of Occupational

and

Professional

Licensing may suspend or revoke the license of a clini cal or
certified

socia

unprofessional
conduct to
Division.

worker
;, ;

include

if

the

Licensee

has

engaged

in

; is section includes unprofessional

a violation of rules established

by

the

The ethical responsibilities of a social worker to a

client are set forth in R153-35-5(B)(1 ), whi ch provides in part:
(e)

The social Worker should under no circumstances
engage in sexual activity with clients.

In its Findings of Fact and Recommended Order, the Board
determined that Licensee and K.G. engaged in sexual activity while
in Hawaii in September, 1985, and found that Licensee 'bad not
properly terminated the client/therapist relationship at that time.
The so] e basi s for finding that Licensee and K.G. engaged in
sexual conduct while in Hawaii in 1985 comes from the testimony of
K.G.

Licensee

incredible.

contends

that

this

testimony

is

false

and

That testimony, in part, indicates:

Q.

And is what you claimed happened in Maui, Mr. G.,
that Ms. Nelson, that Teresa Nelson, performed
oral sex on you?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

And isn't is true that you claim she employed
strawberry ice cream?

A

She did on one occasion, yes.

Q.

And I think you have testified before that you had
]5

A.

eaten strawberry ice cream with her for dessert prior
to that particular event?
Yes.

Q.

Isn't it true that what you claim is that she
performed, on you, oral sex?

A.

That's correct.

(TR. at 260-261).
The Board in Finding of Fact #16 determined that Licensee
and K.G. engaged in oral sex while in Hawaii in 1985, but found
that "there is a lack of credible evidence to find that the conduct
took place as specifically described bv K.G. during the instant
proceeding."

(R. at 71).

Licensee contends that this Finding is

incompatible with the testimony, and is not supported by the record
as a whole.

In essence, by finding that there is a lack of

credible evidence to believe that the conduct took place as
described by K.G., the Board chose not to believe the particulars
of his testimony on this issue.

As K.G.'s testimony of what took

place in Hawaii was the only evidence before the Board of any
sexual activity, it is interesting that the Board rejected his
specific description of what took place, but still choose to
believe the trust of his testimony.

(R. at 72).

Licensee contends that as the board clearly did not
believe this portion of K.G.'s testimony, and that there is no
credible evidence upon which to base the finding that the activity
occurred.
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(Utah App. 1991), this Court held that to successfully challenge a
finding on appeal from an administrative proceeding, the party must
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demonstrate that the finding is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.
Id. at 67-68.
In its Findings of Fact and Recommended Order, the Board
relies upon the "credible testimony offered by K.G.'s brother and
ex-wife," to corroborate the testimony of K.G. to conclude that
sexually intimate activity occurred while K.G. and Licensee were in
Hawaii in 1985.

(Findings of Fact, p.13 Appendix).

There is nothinq in th£ testimony of K.G.'s brother or i n
the testimony of his ex-wife which corroborates the fact that th i s
activity took place. Indeed, in his own testimony, K.G. testified
that he did not tell anybody the details of the alleged sexual
encounter until 1990.

(TR. at 261) .

If K.G. told nobody the

details of the alleged sexual activity with Licensee until five
years after the fact, how can the testimony of those he *-^id
corroborate his testimony?

Licensee asserts that the testimony

K.G.'s brother and K.G.!s ex-wife provide no corroboration

t -

f
s

portion of his testimony.
Further,

under

the

substantial

evidence

test,

both

conf 1 icting and supporting evidence are c orisidereel i n eva 1 uati i :ig
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding. Grace at 68.
This Court also noted in Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 158
UAR 55 (Utah App

1981), that; less deference Is given to the

findings under the substantial evidence standard than under the
clearly erroneous test.

Id. at 60, fn, 7, Licensee has adamately

denied that any sexual activity with K.G. occurred in 198?), the
17

year of the trip to Hawaii. (TR. at 530).

Indeed, it was with

respect to this very issue that Licensee sought to introduce
polygraph evidence to support her contention.
Given the fact that the Board rejected K.G.'s specific
rendition of the alleged sexual activity in Hawaii in 1985; the
conflict in the evidence as to this point; and the fact that five
years elapsed before K.G. told anyone the details of the alleged
sexual conduct, this Court should find that this finding is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
record as a whole.
POINT III
THE CONDUCT OF LICENSEE WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTIONS
IMPOSED BY THE DIVISION.
The

Board

found

that

Licensee

was

also

guilty

of

unprofessional conduct in that she violated R-153-35-5(B)(1)(d),
which reads, the social worker should avoid relationships or
commitments that conflict with the interest of clients.
As set out in the Statement of Facts, Licensee began her
counseling of K.G. while she was employed at the Summit County
Prevention Center. Licensee left her employment with Summit County
in 1982. In September, 1984, K.G. contacted Licensee and indicated
that he wanted to commence counseling with her in her private
practice.

Licensee testified that she told K.G. that her fee was

$55.00 per hour, and asked what type of arrangements he would need
to make for payment. (TR. at 533-34) . At that time, K.G. informed
Licensee that he was a certified wind surfing instructing, and she
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agreed to accept wind surfing lessons from K.G. as payment for her
services.

The Board determined that before September 4, 1984, and July
18,

1985, K.G. provided Licensee with one or two ski lessons and

three to six wi nd sur f I rig lessons.

Licensee * s t w o children! of ten

accompanied her and K.G. during the wind surfing lessons.
69) .

(R.at

The Board determined that while a bartering agreement for

services does not, in and of itself, constitute unprofessional
conduct

within

the

meaning

of

agreement between Licensee and K.G

R153-35-5(B)(1)(d), that

the

was vague and therefore left

K.G. without a clear understanding of the scope and duration of the
agreement,,

(R at 74).

The Board noted that Licensee usually

brought a picnic ,1 unch wi th her during wi nd surf I ng lessons wi th
K.G., and that this conduct created a social atmosphere.
The Board found that this was an exercise of poor judgment by
Licensee, which she should have avoided.

It is important to note,

however, that the Board stated "There is no evidence respondent
(Licensee) acted with malicious intent to K.G.'s detriment or that
her conduct was only self-serving in nature."

It if : u e t-ha t

Licensee exercised poor judgment in that instance, but such conduct
does not justify such harsh sanctions as suspension of her license,
or barring her from the private practice of social work.
While the testimony was conflicting as to whether Licensee
informed K. G

that the cl i ent/therapist relationshi p had tei: minated

prior to going to Hawaii in 1985, it is undisputed that after
19

returning home, K.G. did not again see Licensee in her office.
After

returning

home, K.G.

saw

Licensee

on

four

additional

occasions in 1985, the last occurring in late October.
found

this

conduct

to be problematic

in that

The Board

K.G.

had

not

appropriately terminated the therapist/client relationship prior to
that time. K.G. testified that after his last visit with Licensee
in October, 1985, he made the decision to stop seeing Teresa Nelson
on his own (TR. at 265) .

He went on to indicate that he had no

trouble in making that decision, and that the decision did not
cause him any pain or anguish (TR. at 265).
The Board found that Licensee and K.G. had no contact of any
nature

from

late October

1985 until the

fall

of

1988, and

determined that the client/therapist relationship ceased to exist
after late October 1985.
Assuming arguendo that Licensee Nelson did allow a social
relationship to exist with K.G. after she had stopped seeing him in
her office, that would provide a basis for discipline.

Similarly,

the bartering agreement, due to its vague nature and personal
service aspects, may also provide a basis upon which the Division
could sanction Licensee. Nonetheless, Licensee urges this court to
find that the sanctions imposed by the division are unduly harsh
given her conduct.

In short, the severe sanction of revocation or

suspension of license should be reserved for the most serious
ethical violations.
The only activity alleged by the division which may justify a
suspension of the license would be the existence of the sexual
20

relationship taken place in Hawaii in 1985.

* is also important

to note as a mitigating factor that the alleged conduct took place
in

1985; nearly

five

years

before

K.G.

reported

the

al leged

specifics of the conduct to anyone. During that time, Licensee has
continued to practice social work ii

private setting with no

other complaints against her, thert-i--

niionstrat i ng tha* she is

not a significant risk to the public's health and safety.

But as

Licensee argued above, the findings relative to the conduct in
Hawaii are not supported by substantial evidence.

Ii 1 fact, tl: le

finding relative to that conduct makes it clear that the Board did
not believe K G f s version, of what took place, but nonetheless chose
to believe that something took place. Licensee urges this court to
set aside the suspension of her right to practice social work in a
private setti ng, and urges thi s coui t to a] low her to con/ti iiiie to
do so without an interruption in her license status.

CONCLUSION
The

sanctions

imposed

against Teresa Nelson's

license

to

practice social work will result in substantial hardship which will
seriously

effect

her

ability

to

earn

a

living.

Ms.

Nelson

acknowledges that she made a poor decision in allowing K.G. to meet
her in Hawaii, and perhaps allowed the social relationship with
K.G.

to

exceed

the

appropriate

boundaries.

Nonetheless,

the

severity of the sanctions against her are too harsh, particularly
in light of the fact that the most serious alleged conduct:

t

Licensee was disputed, and the A.L.J, refused to allow her to
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introduce polygraph evidence directly bearing on that conduct.
Licensee urges this court to overturn the portion of the Order
suspending her licenses, and barring her from the private practice
of social work.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2- /

day of December, 1992.

ANN L. WASSERMANN
Attorney for Petitioner
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APPENDIX

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL 6 PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
TERESA L. NELSON
TO PRACTICE AS A CERTIFIED AND
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

O R D E R
Case No. OPL-90-26

The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Director of the
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the State of
Utah.

Respondent's licenses are thus suspended, effective thirty

(30) days from the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the suspended licenses, both wall
and wallet sizes, as well as the embossed certificate, thus be
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.

Dated this

/o^

day of January, 1992.

id.

JU2^Z/:'7

David E. - RplSinson
Director ^^
S -M, M£~

.

if-'.

'"Administrative review of this Order may be obtained by
filing a request for agency review with the executive director of
the Department within thirty (30) days after issuance of this
Order. Any such request must comply with the requirements of the
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12(l) and R151-46b-12 of the departmental
rules which govern agency review.

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
TERESA L. NELSON
TO PRACTICE AS A CERTIFIED AND
CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

:
FINDINGS OF FACT
:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
: AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
:
: CASE NO. OPL-90 -2 6

Appearances:
Melissa M. Hubbell for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
Suzanne M. Dallimore for Respondent
THE BOARD:
Pursuant to notice duly served by certified mail, a hearing
was conducted in the above-entitled matter on November 13-14,
1991 and was then resumed and completed on December 4, 1991
before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce, and the Board of Social Work Examiners.
Board members present, lor the hearing were Eugene Gibbons, Ann M.
Talbot, Patricia Gamble-Hovey, Jennifer Bartell and Mary
Bearnson.

David E. Robinson, the Director of the Division of

Occupational and Professional Licensing, was also present.
Thereafter, evidence was received.

During the first day of

the hearing, Ms. Gamble-Hovey was recused from further
participation in both the hearing and subsequent del i beration by
the Board in this proceeding.

The Board, being fully advised in

the premises, now enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent is, and at times relevant to these

proceedings has been, licensed to practice as a certified and
clinical social worker in the State of Utah.

The record does not

reflect when Respondent was licensed as a certified social
worker, although she was employed in that capacity at the Summit
County Prevention Center in 1980 and subsequently became the
director of that facility.

Respondent obtained her license as a

clinical social worker in 1983, she left the Center in June 1984
and then commenced a full-time private practice as a clinical
social worker with Affiliated Psychotherapists.
2.

Commencing sometine late in 1981, Respondent provided

counseling to a client, referred to herein as K.G., for problems
associated with depression, suicidal ideation, alcohol and
substance abuse.

Counseling continued for a number of months,

often on a weekly basis, and charges for Respondent's services
were based on a sliding fee schedule.

Given his limited

financial ability, K.G. was required to make only nominal
payments for Respondent's services.

K.G. subsequently left

treatment sometime in 1982 and he married in 1983.
3.

On September 4, 1984, K.G. commenced treatment with

Respondent, who provided approximately forty-one (41) hours of
counseling over thirty-three (33) sessions with K.G. through July
18, 1985.

Those sessions addressed K.G.'s alcohol abuse, major

depressive episodes, dysphoric mood, loss of interest and energy,
feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, diminished ability to
think or concentrate, indecisiveness, suicidal ideation and his
2

recurrent thoughts of death.
4 a Between December 7, 1984 and April 9, 1^8b

K u |J<JHJ

Respondent a total of $530 as partial compensation for the*
therapy sessions.

When K.G. had resumed counseling with

Respondent in 1984, they agreed he would subsequently provide r.ki
and wjndsurf i nq lessons to Respondent as compensation for her
services.

Beyond the above-stated cash payments, Respondent and

K.G. apparently understood that one ski or windsurfing lesson
would be exchanger! fm each therapy session.
5.

When Respondent and K.G. agreed to barter their

services, Respondent normally charged $55 for a one (1) hour
session.

No discussion occurred between Respondent and K.G. as

to what the latter would normally charge for lessons he would
provide, no common understanding existed as to the duration of
their bartering agreement and Respondent believed the lessons she
received from K.G. would only operate to pay for some of her
counseling services.
6.

Respondent had previously bartered her; services with two

other clients to obtain a single ski lesson on one occasion and,
in other Instance?, piano lessons for her children,

In edch case,

the value of the respective services to be exchanqijd was
initially discussed between Respondent and her client and each
party to thw agreement understood the extent of services which
would be bartered.
7.

Between September 4, 1984 and July 18, 1985, K.G.

provided Respondent with 1-2 ski lessons and 3-6 windsurfing
lessons.

During one of the ski lessons, K.G. provided little 3

if any - instruction on skiing techniques to Respondent, he spoke
to Respondent of family ski outings with his parents when he was
a child and generally considered the time he spent with
Respondent during the lesson as similar to that of a therapy
session.

As she testified during this proceeding, Respondent's

interaction with K.G. at that time was consistent with the
Rogarian approach she might use in therapy sessions with a
client.
8.

K.G. is a certified windsurfing instructor and has

offered such lessons to other individuals.

Respondent's two

children often accompanied her and K.G. when the latter provided
windsurfing lessons.
on those occasions.

Respondent usually brought a picnic lunch
Such conduct created a social atmosphere

unlike that present during windsurfing lessons K.G. has offered
to other individuals at other times.
9.

During therapy sessions in early 1985, K.G. periodically

informed Respondent of conflicts with his wife, who was initially
reluctant to participate in marriage counseling.

During two

sessions in February 1985, K.G. told Respondent his wife had
agreed to start such counseling and he expressed hope his
marriage would continue.
10.
wife.

On February 26, 1985, Respondent met only with K.G.'s

Respondent then held two co-joint counseling sessions on

March 5 and 19, 1985.

Respondent believed many unalterable

conflicts existed in the marriage and she inquired of both K.G.
and his wife if they had considered obtaining a divorce.

Based

on the credible evidence presented, both K.G. and his wife
4

believed Respondent had thus suggested they should be divorced.
No further co-joint sessions were conducted,

During K.G.'s next

session on April 9, 1985, Respondent noted K.G.'s marital
relationship appeared in be deterioratinq

K.G, told Respondent

he was depressed and informed her that he was considering a
divorce.
11

During the next counselinq session on Ma\ ?Bt

19 as(

K.G. informed Respondent that he and his wife were separated and
filing for a divorce.

"When K.G. also told Respondent he was

depressed, she decided to commence hypnosis and util I ze age
regression techniques to obtain more information regarding K.G.'s
lack of nurturi ng and his ability to self-nurture.
12,

Respondent used hypnosis and age regression techniques

during eight (8) counseling sessions with K.G. between May 31,
1985 and 3 til y 2 8, 1 985,, Duri ng a June 10, 1985 session, K.G.
expressed sadness regarding his divorce and indicated he f€ilt
empty and suicidal.

During a July 8, 1985 session, Respondent

related he had attempted suicide the night before hi s wife left
and he was tired of not feeling good.

He also expressed a sense

of hopelessness, sadness and frustration.
13.

The last formal therapy session Respondent provided to

K.G. was conducted in her office on July 18, 1985.

Respondent

used hypnosis during that session, she noted K.G. lacked
direction in his career goals and he was chemically more stable.
Respondent recommended K.G. continue with his existing
medicati on.

Clinical notes from Respondent's records do not

reflect she terminated K.G. as a client at that time.
5

14.

Based on the more credible evidence presented,

Respondent did not inform K.G. the client/therapist relationship
was terminated on July 18, 1985 and there is no evidence K.G.
believed his status as a client ended after that therapy session.
Based on the* more credible evidence, and given the relatively
indefinite manner in which Respondent had obtained compensation
for the services she had provided to K.G. since September 1984,
there was no agreement between them to end his therapy based on
any concern he would be unable to pay for ongoing treatment.

A

review of Respondent's clinical notes does not reflect K.G. had
progressed in counseling as to no longer require therapy.
15.

Between mid-August 1985 and early-September 1985,

Respondent and K.G. socialized on three occasions.

Specifically,

they played tennis and K.G. twice visited Respondent at her home.
During that second visit in early September 1985, Respondent
informed K.G. she was leaving for a vacation in Hawaii on
September 15, 1985.

There is a lack of sufficient evidence to

find that Respondent invited K.G. to join her.

However,

Respondent told K.G. she would be staying in a condominium while
there, she informed him of both the length of her trip and her
scheduled departure and further indicated she would have access
to a rental car.
16.

A few days prior to her departure for Hawaii, K.G.

informed Respondent he had purchased an airline ticket and
inquired if he could join her.

Respondent agreed, she arrived in

Hawaii on September 15, 1985 and met K.G. at the airport when he
arrived that same day on a subsequent flight.
6

They stayed in

Hawaii for approximately one week and spent a majority of their
time together.(Based on the more credible evidence presented,
Respondent and K.G. slept together and periodically engaged in
conduct which was sexually intimate in nature.I While no
intercourse occurred, Respondent and K.G. did engage in oral sex,
although there is a lack of credible evidence to find that such
conduct took place as specifically described by K.G. during the
instant proceeding.
17.

Respondent and K.G. left Hawaii on separate flights.

During the following month until late-October 1985, they were
together on four additional occasions.

Specifically, Respondent,

her two children and K.G. had dinner at Respondent's home in
late-September 1985, K.G. arrived drunk and unannounced at
Respondent's home one night, they met at a soccer game
approximately one week later and they also had dinner at a
restaurant in late-October 1985. Based on the more credible
evidence, Respondent and K.G. briefly kissed and hugged at least
one of those occasions, but they did not engage in any sexual
activity other than what had occurred in Hawaii during the
previous month.
19.

Respondent and K.G. had no contact of any nature from

late-October 1985 until the fall of 1988 and their
client/therapist relationship ceased to exist after late-October
1985.

Based on the more credible evidence presented, that

relationship did not resume at any time during subsequent contact
which occurred between Respondent and K.G. from the fall of 1988
through mid-1989.
7

20.

K.G. obtained outpatient alcohol rehabilitative

treatment for three weeks in Oregon during mid-1989.

On July 31,

1989, K.G. commenced inpatient therapy at the Western Institute
of Neuropsychiatry in Utah to address both his alcohol dependency
and a suicide attempt.

K.G. was subsequently referred to another

therapist for further counseling and he has been receiving such
therapy during the past two years.
21.

Based on the credible evidence presented, K.G. has

blamed himself for the relationship which existed with
Respondent, he has been somewhat traumatized by his recollection
of certain aspects of that relationship and he encountered some
difficulty in subsequently discussing that relationship with
other therapists.

Given his feelings of guilt, betrayal and

self-condemnaition, K.G. was adversely impacted - to some degree in his ability to trust therapy and subsequently obtain
counseling from other therapists.

This record does not reflect

the current state of K.G.'s mental health or the degree of
progress he may have realized in counseling during the past two
years with his present therapist.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent acknowledges she exercised poor judgment when she
allowed K.G. to join her in Hawaii.

However, Respondent contends

she never engaged in any conduct which conflicted with K.G.'s
interests and she did not misuse her professional relationship as
his therapist for her own personal gain.

Respondent further

asserts their client/therapist relationship ceased prior to the
Hawaiian vacation and did not subsequently resume.
8

Respondent

thus urges no basis exists to enter any disciplinary sanction as
to her license.
Section 58-35-11, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
provides the Division may suspend or revoke the license of a
certified or clinical social worker if the licensee has engaged
in unprofessional conduct.

Section 58-35-11(6) defines

unprofessional conduct to include a violation of rules
established by the Division.

R153-35-5(B)(1) generally sets

forth that the social worker's primary ethical responsibility is
to clients.

That rule further provides:

(d) The social worker should avoid
relationships or commitments that conflict
with the interests of clients.
(e) The social worker should under no
circumstances engage in sexual activities
with clients.
Respondent engaged in unethical conduct violative of R15335-5(B)(l)(d) in various instances.

The Board initially notes

that, while Respondent agreed to exchange counseling services for
lessons from K.G., the bartering of her services does not - in
and of itself - constitute unprofessional conduct within the
meaning of R153-35-5(B)(1)(d).

However, it is evident the

agreement between Respondent and K.G. was not well defined and no
clear understanding existed as to the scope and duration of that
agreement.
Further, the agreement between Respondent and K.G. was not
typical of bartering agreements Respondent had made with other
clients.

It is particularly disturbing that Respondent agreed

to receive a direct personal service from K.G., the nature and
9

duration of which established a social relationship between them.
On at least one occasion during a lesson, Respondent and K.G.
interacted in a manner similar to that which had occurred during
any given therapy session.

Such conduct was not congruent with

either K.G.'s or Respondent's role in a mere instructor/ student
relationship.

The resulting dual relationship which existed

necessarily presented some confusion to K.G.
Moreover, given K.G.'s existing problems with alcoholism and
Respondent's diagnosis of his mental condition, it is critically
significant she failed to understand and appreciate K.G. would
thus tend to develop increasing dependency on her as his
therapist.

The nature of the bartering agreement between

Respondent and K.G. also fostered such dependency and reflects
Respondent's further failure to manage the therapeutic
relationship in such a way that the proper boundaries of that
relationship were clearly understood by the client.
Had Respondent carefully evaluated K.G.'s condition, she
would have properly understood the nature of the dynamics he
brought to the therapy relationship and she should have
necessarily avoided engaging in pleasureable activities with K.G.
in a socialized setting.

There is no evidence Respondent acted

with malicious intent to K.G.'s detriment or that her conduct was
only self-serving in nature. However, Respondent either did not
adequately evaluate or she disregarded the nature of K.G.'s
condition and thus interacted with him in a manner which
conflicted with his best interests.
Given the extended duration of therapy Respondent had
10

provided to K.G. prior to early 1985, coupled with the
inappropriate bartering agreement which existed, Respondent also
failed to promote the best interests of the marriage between K.G.
and his wife.

They could have reasonably understood Respondent

had advised them to obtain a divorce.

While Respondent did not

intend to direct them toward such action, the counseling she
offered to them was ambiguous and she should have scrupulously
avoided any uncertainty as to whether she was advising them to
end their marriage.
The nature of co-joint counseling Respondent offered was
particularly disconcerting to K.G.'s wife, who was also her
client and had informed Respondent she wanted her marriage to
remain intact.

K.G.'s wife was aware of the existence and nature

of the bartering agreement between K.G. and Respondent.

Such

knowledge caused her to reasonably believe that an alliance and
socialization existed between Respondent and K.G. which, in turn,
hindered her ability to candidly discuss marital problems with
Respondent toward possible improvement in her marriage.

Under

such circumstances, Respondent should not have provided any cojoint marriage counseling and the nature of the therapy she did
offer was not consistent with the interests of both clients.
Given K.G.'s dependency on Respondent as his therapist, he
perceived the contact between them which arose from the bartering
agreement to be beneficial to him in a therapeutic sense, even
though Respondent may not have either recognized or intended that
result.

However, the enhanced dependency created by the nature

of the bartering agreement was not proper.
11

Furthermore, the

continuing interaction between Respondent and K.G. which occurred
in social settings after July 18, 1985 improperly tended to
sustain K.G. in a therapeutic sense and confirmed his ongoing
belief that a client/therapist relationship continued to exist.
All credible evidence suggests that no basis existed to
terminate the just-stated relationship in mid-July 1985, no such
termination actually occurred and, in light of his condition at
that time, it would have not been in K.G.'s best interest to
terminate that relationship.

Ironically, Respondent should have

continued to provide formal therapy to K.G. after July 18, 1985
rather than precipitously terminate therapy sessions in an office
setting and continue on-going contacts with K.G. elsewhere.
Had Respondent intended to unmistakably end K.G.'s status as
a client in mid-July 1985, she had the responsibility to utilize
proper procedures to terminate that relationship.
clearly failed to do so.

Respondent

Her clinical notes do not corroborate

her claims that K.G. desired to end therapy, that therapy for him
was no longer warranted or that any other proper basis existed to
end the client/therapist relationship.

Further, her testimony in

that regard is not persuasive.
Given all of the foregoing, it is not surprising K.G. wanted
to accompany Respondent to Hawaii and it is entirely regrettable
Respondent consented to that joint vacation.

Based on

Respondent's testimony as to the motivation for her acquiescence
in that regard, she had clearly assumed undue responsibility for
K.G.'s general welfare.

Thus, Respondent's inability or

unwillingness to avoid cross-tranference with K.G. also
12

conflicted with his best interests.
Sparing detail, Respondent also violated R153-35-5(B)(1)(e).
The Board initially notes that K.G.'s conduct in relationships
with other individuals reflects a degree of situational ethics
and dishonesty.

The Board further recognizes the somewhat self-

serving nature of Respondent's testimony, particularly given the
nature of this proceeding and possible consequences as to her
licensure.

However, based on credible testimony offered by

K.G.'s brother and ex-wife which tends to corroborate K.G.'s
testimony, and a considered assessment of the respective
credibility of both K.G. and Respondent,/ the Board concludes that
physically intimate sexual activity occurred while they were in
Hawaii.\
Thus, an appropriate basis exists to enter a disciplinary
sanction with respect to Respondent's ability to practice as a
certified and clinical social worker in this state.

Commendably,

Respondent has adjusted the nature of her practice in certain
respects as a result of her experience with K.G. as a client.
Specifically, Respondent no longer offers counseling to single
male clients other than in a family setting, she does not permit
home visits by clients and she thus recognizes certain boundary
issues and the need to avoid creating inappropriate levels of
dependency between herself and clients.

Further, there is no

evidence Respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct with
respect to other clients.
Despite the foregoing, Respondent did engage in highly
questionable clinical practices with regard to the counseling she
13

offered to K.G.

The nature of the numerous deficiencies in

Respondent's professional performance reflects the need for
additional education of a remedial nature. Respondent's conduct
also periodically conflicted with the best interests of both K.G.
and his ex-wife in various respects.

Thusf an appropriately

severe sanction should enter to reflect the extreme degree of
Respondent's departure from generally accepted ethical standards
which govern her profession and with due regard for the adverse
consequences which resulted from that misconduct.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's licenses to
practice as a certified and clinical social worker in the State
of Utah be revoked.
It is further ordered that a stay of enforcement enter as to
the just-stated revocation, Respondent's license as a clinical
social worker shall be suspended for three (3) years and her
license as a certified social worker shall be suspended for one
(1) year, effective thirty (30) days from the date this
Recommended Order may be adopted by the Director of the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing.

The suspension of

Respondent's licenses is subject to the following terms and
conditions:
1. Respondent shall receive individual
therapy from either a psychologist,
psychiatrist or clinical social worker who
has been licensed in that capacity and
continuously so employed for at least the
last five (5) years. At a minimum, such
therapy shall address Respondent's ethical
violations, her responsiblity for that
conduct, the manner in which her codependency
may have contributed to her misconduct and
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proper procedures necessary to manage a
client/therapist relationship.
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date
this Recommended Order may be adopted,
Respondent shall submit the name of the
above-referenced therapist for Board review
and possible approval. Thereafter,
Respondent's therapist shall submit written
reports to the Board every six (6) months as
to the nature of therapy provided to
Respondent and her progress in that regard.
Therapy shall continue until such time as
Respondent's therapist informs the Board it
is no longer warranted and the Board
recommends that therapy may cease.
3. Respondent shall meet with the Board
during the next regularly scheduled Board
meeting held after this Recommended Order may
be adopted. Thereafter, Respondent shall
meet with the Board every six (6) months
during the terms of suspension set forth
herein. The frequency of such meetings may
be subsequently modified, as deemed warranted
by the Board.
4. Respondent shall complete coursework
which addresses the subjects of professional
values and ethics, DSM - III, human growth
and development, and clinical practice
procedures. Within thirty (30) days from the
date this Recommended Order may be adopted,
Respondent shall submit an education program
for Board review and approval, which provides
a minimum of nine (9) quarter hours to be
completed in that respect.
5. Upon satisfactory completion of the
above-stated terms and conditions and the
expiration of the one (1) year suspension of
Respondent's license as a certified social
worker, Respondent may practice in that
capacity in an agency setting, but may not
engage in private practice. Respondent's
employment shall be subject to supervision by
a licensed clinical social worker.
Respondent shall provide prior written notice
to the Board of any such employment and her
prospective supervisor in that regard. Upon
Board review and approval, such employment
may commence and Respondent's supervisor
shall submit written reports to the Board
every six (6) months as to the nature of
15

Respondent7s duties and her performance in
that regard.
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms
and conditions or otherwise violate any statute or rule which
governs her practice as a social worker in the State of Utah,
further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made
whether the revocation of Respondent's licenses shall become
effective.
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BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES
OF TERESA L. NELSON TO PRACTICE
AS A CERTIFIED AND CLINICAL
SOCIAL WORKER IN THE
STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON REVIEW
CASE NO. OPL-90-26

INTRODUCTION
By order dated January 10, 1992 (the "Order") , the Director of
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing of the Utah
Department of Commerce (the "Division") adopted the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and recommended order of the Utah Board
of Social Work Examiners (the "Board")-

The Order followed a

hearing on a petition filed by the Division requesting sanctions
against the license of Teresa L. Nelson ("Respondent") to practice
as a certified social worker and as a clinical social worker.
The Order revoked Respondent's licenses to practice as a
certified social worker and as a clinical social worker.

The

revocations were stayed subject to certain conditions, among them:
that Respondent's license as a clinical social worker be suspended
for three years, and the license as a certified social worker be
suspended for one year; that Respondent receive therapy; that she
complete an education program; and that upon reinstatement of her
license to practice as a certified social worker she not practice
in a private setting.

Respondent filed a request for agency review, and the Division
filed

a

response

thereto.

Respondent

was

represented

by

attorney at the hearing and also in her request for review.

an
In

connection with review, Respondent seeks the following remedies:
1.
a

that the portions of the Recommended Order providing for

three-year

suspension of Respondent's

license as a clinical

social worker, and a one-year suspension of her license as a
certified social worker, be reversed and instead, that an order
enter permitting Respondent to continue to practice;
2.

that paragraph 1 of the Recommended Order provide for

counselling of Respondent for only one year, rather than until the
Board recommend that it cease; and
3.

that

paragraph

5

of

the

Recommended

Order

(that

Respondent may not, after the one-year suspension of her certified
social worker's license, engage in private practice) be reversed.

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive
Director of the Department of Commerce pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 63-46b-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure
for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.

THE ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Whether

excluding

certain

evidence

at

the

hearing

(results of a polygraph) unfairly denied Respondent the right to
present credible evidence on her own behalf;
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2.

Whether the Board based its findings on an issue (alleged

adverse impact on a witness caused by Respondent's conduct) which
was not properly before it, where evidence on that issue had been
excluded by a prior order of the Administrative Law Judge;
3•

Whether certain facts upon which the Board relied were

not supported by the evidence; and
4.

Whether

the

sanctions

imposed

are

unduly

harsh or

otherwise unfair.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The following findings of fact in the Recommended Order

are contested by Respondent:
a.

that there was a sexual relationship during 1985

between Respondent and K.G., Respondent's patient for a time
and a witness at the hearing; and
b.

that

K.G.

had

developed

a

dependency

upon

Respondent.
2.

As to the existence of a sexual relationship, if any,

between Respondent and K.G, during 1985, the Board considered
testimony that such relationship did exist, from K.G., from K.G.'s
brother, and from K.G.'s ex-wife.

It considered testimony that

there was no such relationship from Respondent. The Administrative
Law Judge declined to allow evidence from a polygraph examination
of Respondent which, Respondent argues, would have tended to
support her testimony. Respondent asserts that the "most credible
evidence" would have been the polygraph. Respondent does not point
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out why the evidence from the client and others is not credible,
nor does she offer convincing evidence or arguments that polygraph
results are more credible than testimony from witnesses.
3.

As to whether the client had developed a dependency on

Respondent, Respondent argues that findings of fact on this point
are

not

supported

by

the

evidence.

Respondent

offered

no

transcript but merely asserted this point in the request for
review.

The Order made no specific findings of fact regarding

K.G.'s dependency upon Respondent.

The Conclusions of Law stated

in part that:
Moreover, given K.G.'s existing problems with alcoholism
and Respondent's diagnosis of his mental condition, it is
critically significant she failed to understand and appreciate
K.G. would thus tend to develop increasing dependency on her
as his therapist.
The nature of the bartering agreement
between Respondent and K.G. also fostered
such dependency and
reflects Respondent's further failure to manage the
therapeutic relationship in such a way that the proper
boundaries of that relationship were clearly understood by the
client. [Order, p. 10; italics added.]
Given

K.G.'s

dependency

on Respondent

as his therapist,

he perceived the contact betweem them which arose from the
bartering agreement to be beneficial to him in a therapeutic
sense, even though Respondent may not have either recognized
or intended that result. However, the enhanced dependency
created by the nature of the bartering agreement was not
proper. [Order, p. 11; italics added.]

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
unfair

With respect to whether excluding polygraph evidence was
to

Respondent,

I conclude

that

the

decision

of

the

Administrative Law Judge excluding the evidence should be upheld.
Although the rules of evidence in administrative proceedings are
meant to be flexible and less formal than the Utah Rules of
- 4 -

Evidence, and therefore admitting polygraph evidence may have been
permissible, the decision to deny the evidence was reasonable under
the circumstances.

The state offered precedent that polygraph

evidence is insufficiently credible and that such evidence may be
denied admission in the administrative forum.

In addition, the

Order was based on sufficient evidence other than that germane to
the

polygraph

--

e.g.

whether

or

not

there

relationship at a specific time and place.

was

a

sexual

Although the Board

found sufficient evidence to support the finding that a sexual
relationship actually occurred, even if it had not there was still
sufficient evidence and findings to support a penalty. Aside from
the sexual relationship, the Order found that Respondent had
improperly socialized with the client; had not properly terminated
the patient-therapist

relationship; engaged

conflicted with the patient's best

in behavior which

interests; had improperly

conducted joint counselling with the patient and his wife; and
otherwise failed to act in the patient's best interest.
2.
primarily

Respondent asserts that adverse impact on the patient -that

he

became

dependent

improperly considered by the Board.

upon

Respondent

—

was

As to whether the client had

become dependent upon Respondent, reading the quoted language from
pages 10 and 11 of the Order, (see Findings of Fact, above, at
paragraph 3) , it appears that the Order went from what could happen
to assuming that it did happen. As there are no specific findings
of fact regarding dependency, that portion of the Order concluding
that K.G. was in fact dependent upon Respondent is overturned.
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Even if the issue of adverse impact on the client was improperly
before the Board it appears that the Order is supported by
sufficient findings aside from this point.

Although the issue of

impact was addressed in the Order, it was only briefly raised.
Rather, the Board found that Respondent exercised poor judgement
with respect to the trip to Hawaii; she engaged in a social
relationship and other conduct which conflicted with the best
interests of her client; she did not adequately terminate the
professional

relationship

prior

to

beginning

a

personal

relationship; her conduct constituted unprofessional conduct within
the meaning of Rule 153-35-5(B).

From the terms of the order, it

appears that these items were given much more weight than any
adverse impact on K.G. and that these items were sufficient to
support a sanction against Respondent's license. The Order clearly
indicates that the reasons for the sanction are the actions of
Respondent, rather than their effect on someone else.

As noted

above, the impact, if any, on the client, even if not admissible is
a relatively minor portion of the decision.
3.

The sanctions entered are within the Board's authority.

Both Section 58-1-15 and Section 58-35-11 allow the Board to deny,
suspend, revoke or place on probation a license where the licensee
has been guilty of unprofessional conduct.

Based on Respondent's

own admissions, she clearly exercised poor judgement and allowed
the relationship to expand beyond what is appropriate professional
conduct.

While there is sufficient evidence that a sanction is

warranted, the penalty imposed by the Board seems unduly harsh in
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view of penalties

entered

in similar

cases.

A

three year

suspension may be unreasonable, particularly given the disputed
facts, the passage of time with no other complaints against
Respondent other than this one, and the fact that there does not
appear to be a significant risk to the public health and safety.
4.

In

addition,

clarification.

one

portion

of

the

Order

Paragraph 5 of the Order is open-ended.

needs
It

provides that upon satisfactory completion of the probation under
the terms and conditions listed, and the expiration of the one year
suspension of Respondent's license to practice as a ceirtified
social worker, Respondent may practice in an agency setting but may
not engage in private practice.

The Order appears to leave this

prohibition permanent. However, the remainder of the Order appears
to suspend Respondent's licenses and place her on probation for a
certain length of time, subject to certain terms and conditions.
Although such actions are proper, the prohibition against private
practice

ought

not

be permanent

or

open-ended.

Therefore,

paragraph 5 of the Order is modified so as to make the prohibition
against private practice less indefinite or open-ended.

ORDER
It is hereby ordered that:
1.

The Conclusions of Law are modified by striking the

following portions, found on page 11 of the Findings, Conclusions
and Order:
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a.

"Given

K.G.'s dependency

on Respondent

as his

therapist"; and
b.

"However, the enhanced dependency created by the

nature of the bartering agreement was not proper."
2.

The Order

(beginning

on page

14

of

the Findings,

Conclusions, and Order) is modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's licenses to
practice as a certified and clinical social worker in the
State of Utah be revoked.
It is further ordered that a stay of enforcement enter as
to the just-stated revocations cind that Respondent's licenses
be suspended for six (6) months and then placed on probation,
under the terms specified hereinbelow.
Following the terms of suspension, the revocations shall
remain stayed and Respondent's licenses subject to probation
for up to three

(3) years, on the following terms and

conditions:
1.
Respondent shall receive individual therapy
from either a psychologist, psychiatrist or clinical
social worker who has been licensed in that capacity and
continuously so employed for at least the last five (5)
years.
At a minimum, such therapy shall address
Respondent's ethical violations, her responsibility for
that conduct, the manner in which her codependency may
have contributed to her misconduct and proper procedures
necessary to manage a client/therapist relationship.
2.
Within thirty (30) days from the date of this
Order, Respondent shall submit the name of the abovereferenced therapist for Board review and approval. If
the Board does not approve, then Respondent shall
promptly submit another name until the Board approves.
Thereafter, Respondent shall commence therapy and
Respondent's therapist shall submit written reports to
the Board every six (6) months as to the nature of
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therapy provided to Respondent and her progress in that
regard. Respondent shall execute a written consent and
release if necessary, so as to allow her therapist to
disclose such matters to the Board.
Therapy shall
continue until such time as Respondent's therapist
informs the Board that therapy is no longer warranted and
the Board recommends that therapy may cease, or until the
expiration of the three years' probationary period,
whichever occurs first.
3 . Respondent shall meet with the Board during the
next regularly scheduled Board meeting held after this
Order becomes effective. Thereafter, Respondent shall
meet with the Board every six (6) months during the term
of suspension and probation.
The frequency of such
meetings may be subsequently modified, as deemed
warranted by the Board.
4.
Respondent shall complete coursework which
addresses the subjects of professional values and ethics,
DSM-III, human growth and development, and clinical
practice procedures. Within thirty (30) days from the
date this Order becomes effective, Respondent shall
submit an education program for Board review and
approval, which provides a minimum of nine (9) qiiarter
hours to be completed in that respect.
5.
During the three-year probationary period, and
unless the Board finds that Respondent is not meeting the
terms and conditions of probation (which finding the
Board may make in an informal proceeding) , Respondent may
practice as a certified social worker in an agency
setting, but may not engage in private practice.
Respondent's employment shall be subject to supervision
by a licensed clinical social worker. Respondent shall
provide prior written notice to the Board of any such
employment and her prospective supervisor in that regard.
Upon Board review and approval, such employment may
commence and Respondent's supervisor shall submit written
reports to the Board every six (6) months as to the
nature of Respondent's duties and her performance in that
regard.
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated
terms and conditions, or otherwise violate any statute or rule
which governs her practice as a social worker in the State of
Utah,

further

proceedings
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shall

be

conducted

and

a

determination made whether the stay shall be rescinded and the
revocation of Respondent's licenses shall become effective.
2.

The effective date of the Order is ten days from the date this

order on review is issued.
Dated this

/g

day of

/Ifin I

, 1992

David L. Buhler, Executive Director
Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16.

- 10 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Petitioner's Brief to the following on this '2^:
day
of December, 1992.
DELIA M. WELCH
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

